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ABSTRACT 
As highlighted by previous work in Normal Accident Theory1 and High Reliability Organisations, 2 the ability of a 
system to be flexible is of critical importance to its capability to prepare for, respond to, and recover from disturbance 
and disasters.  This paper proposes that the research into ‘edge organisations’3 and ‘agility’4 is a potential means to 
operationalise components that embed high reliable traits in the management and oversight of critical infrastructure 
systems.   
 
Much prior work has focused on these concepts in a military frame whereas the study reported on here examines the 
application of these concepts to aviation infrastructure, specifically, a commercial international airport.  As a 
commercial entity functions in a distinct manner from a military organisation this study aims to better understand the 
complementary and contradictory components of the application of agility work to a commercial context.  Findings 
highlight the challenges of making commercial operators of infrastructure systems agile as well as embedding traits of 
High Reliability in such complex infrastructure settings. 
 





Airports are a typical example of complex sociotechnical systems encompassing a flow of people, goods 
and services, all within the context of critical infrastructure.  The provision of reliable capabilities and 
capacities for continued operations in airports is a complicated task at the best of times.  Disturbances such 
as operational failures with check-in and passenger facilitation systems, natural disasters, weather variability, 
and incidents involving terrorists or criminal acts shift operational and tactical decision making from 
complicated to complex.  The challenge of coordinating and planning for such complex sociotechnical 
scenarios places considerable pressure on airport management to facilitate coordination of what are often 
conflicting goals and expectations between groups in respect to safe and secure air travel.  Further, when an 
airport system encounters crisis, the nature of the relationships between airport operators, government, first 
response agencies, and private contractors need to adjust with the goal of bringing functionality back to a 
state of normal operations, as opposed to responding organisations looking after their own interests in 
isolation from the broader airport system.   
 
This paper proposes ‘Agility Theory’ as a potential means of enhancing the way airport systems change 
modes of operations in a more efficient manner as a means of enhancing crisis management and decision 
making.  Agility Theory provides a means of understanding of how adjustment of implicit and tacit forms of 
group dynamics, specifically persons making decisions during a crisis, are able to aid in providing 
operational continuity and subsequent critical infrastructure recovery (reference).  This position is in contrast 
to traditional forms of hierarchal command and control decision making and places more focus on the 
development and activation of high performance and flat structured teams.  Initially this paper will provide a 
brief literature discussion of agility theory followed by discussion of how these concepts are presently 
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functioning at an international airport; which contrasts how the academic position and the practitioner 
perspective develop in a real world setting.  Furthermore, challenges of this approach will be discussed along 
with suggestions for future development and contributions to the field.   
 
 
1. LITERATURE & BACKGROUND 
 
Agility, as a complementary concept to the notion of high reliability functioning, is an important 
consideration in any organisation seeking optimal functionality when responding to crisis.  The literature on 
work teams which operate during crisis events, yet maintain resilient decision-making capability, have been 
described as using the concept of ‘edge organizing.’3 Edge organising was conceptualised as both a 
description and explanation of an approach which functions in a manner quite distinct from that of a 
traditional top-down, hierarchal, command and control approach to crisis decision making and management.  
It has been noted that “Edge organisations are particularly well suited to deal with uncertainty and 
unfamiliarity because they make more of their relevant knowledge, experience, and expertise available”.3 
Therefore, the edge operating principal is one which places high regard on operational capabilities, flexibility 
and ready access to information to deal with situations as they arise, thus taking advantage of not having to 
function within a regimented and constrained chain-of-command.   
 
Literature on the edge operating principal highlights the key advantage of this approach is to be ‘agile’; 
where ‘agility’ is conceptualised as the ability of an edge organisation to be “robust, flexible, responsive, 
innovative, resilient and adaptive” during crisis.4  A number of key features of agility include: distributive 
information, collective sensemaking, distributive power-base, dynamic task allocation, and shared 
understanding of command intent.3,5   Similar to the notion of reliability theory:2 preoccupation with failure, 
reluctance to simplify, sensitivity to operations, commitment to resilience and deference to expertise, the 
distinguishing features of agile performance help us to understand the ability of an organisation to quickly 
and efficiently deal with a disturbance event.  If we consider this in the form of a crisis, an organisation 
which has better access to information, a decision making approach which can deal with a wide range of 
factors and perspectives, an understanding of goals, and the ability to task accordingly will be able to make 
better decisions more quickly.  Compared to a more traditional hierarchical approach, the agile approach 
enables more efficient transition between tasks in terms of the requirements to bring operations back online 
as they present themselves during the specific scenario.  Where as some approaches to response deal with 
prescriptive checklist the agile approach is more focused on how we can adjust decision making to quickly 
deal with novel disturbance events.   
 
Within this context, highly agile organisations are those which have high levels of control, interaction, 
and information flow.  Although the concept of edge organisations originated in military settings requiring 
extensive agility, it has significant similarity to issues examined in detailed studies of organizational 
flexibility and reliability 6,7 which identified the ability of flexible organisations to better contend with crises 
and their consequences.  This discussion does not promote the notion that all organisations can become ‘edge 
organisations’ but rather that the concept of agility is one which can be used to enhance the ways in which 
organisational members recognise, react, and respond to crisis events.  When the concept of agility is 
contextualised within the setting of High Reliability Principles,2 the capability of an organisation to adapt 
both culturally in terms of assumptions and values and functionally by ability and performance, presents a 
particularly strong frame of reference for exploring options for an organisation to deal with crisis events.  As 
airport systems deal with a range of disturbances from normal operations disruption through to crisis events, 
the embedding of agile practice enables an organisation to shift, in both an explicit and tacit sense, modes of 
operation in a mode seamless manner.  Essentially, we have the ability to function as a normal business 
entity when we are operating in a business-as-usual environment and adjust to a response mode when the 
environment dictates.   
 
2. METHOD 
This research reported in this paper is derived from a qualitative research design incorporating elements of 
observation, in-depth interview, and documentary analysis at a single international airport case study site.  
Observation maintains a key advantage over other social science research methods in its ability to provide 
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directness to the phenomena and context under investigation.8  Where interviews and documents may 
provide an idealized representation of practice,9 observation enables the researcher to see the situation 
directly and witness how events unfold without the added interpretive distortion of having to discern 
meaning from the recounts of others.10  By collecting data through a mix of observation, talk and text, 
considerable advantages are gained in the triangulation of meaning from data and sense-making of 
unexpected and emergent findings; thus enhancing the overall internal and external validity of the research. 
 
Data Collection 
First, the primary author undertook 44 days of observation at an international airport working alongside 
the risk, emergency management, airside safety, and first response business units.  During the observation 
the researcher was involved in both training and real life response activities. Active note taking and 
reflective diaries were utilized as the key mode of recording insights and events from on-site observation. 
This data was then translated into detailed notes against the research focus of crisis management functions 
with specific focus given to how business units change modes of operation as events or disturbances 
emerged during day-to-day operational and training activities.   
 
Second, an in-depth key-informant interview was undertaken with the airports emergency manager 
specific to the five key components agility.3,5 This interview lasted over two hours and notes were 
transcribed and analysed to compare and contrast the theoretical concepts of agility against the practical 
application of the concept.  In-depth interviews are noted as particularly useful in areas where topics have 
been previously unexplored (or underexplored) in literature and require a more detailed interrogation of 
concepts.11  The interview was particularly important for understanding how and why observed events 
unfolded in the way they were observed, and responses were also used to critique how formal policies and 
procedures were adopted during disturbances to regular operations (as an extension of the analysis of 
documents).  
 
Having a sole observer could raise some concerns for potentially myopic interpretations of observed 
events impacting on both the descriptive and interpretive validity of the research.12   However, the discussion 
of observations during the key-informant interview stage, in combination with the documentary analysis 





This section will discuss the five components of agility4,5 as they were observed at the international 
airport case site.  This discussion will focus on three components for each agility area.  First, this discussion 
will detail what an idealized application of the concept would look like in an airport context.  Second, the 
current practitioner issues on the specific component of agility will be identified and discussed.  And finally, 
current practice at this specific international airport will be discussed with an emphasis to how current 
practice can inform the current (underdeveloped) literature for agility in complex sociotechnical systems.   
 
Distributive Information 
The first component of distributive information focuses on the means by which accurate, appropriate, and 
timely information can be made available to decision makers.  In an ideal setting this would be a function 
whereby decision makers can gain situational awareness quickly by the use of formal and informal networks 
to deal with a specific scenario presented.  Research highlighted two key areas of importance regarding 
distributive information from a practitioner perspective; credibility of information is paramount as it will be 
used in both internal incident decisions and third party stakeholders who make operational and commercial 
decisions based on our advice, and in a post crisis sense, detailed reports of events to interrogate if we have 
truly solved the issue or if it could continue to be a systemic problem.  Currently the airport functions in a 
system whereby final solutions rather than a process based approach are favoured in information.  The 
airport discussed an intention to move to a holistic information approach that included both proactive 






The second component of collective sensemaking states the need to develop decision making capacity 
quickly and efficiently.  In an ideal approach decisions are made in high performance teams with a clear 
understanding of how preparation and planning, as well as experience from prior events, impact the 
decisions needed to minimize and contain the crisis.  For example, one event discussed was a wheels up 
landing which required different managers to come together quickly and understand both the severity of the 
situation to operations against the business need to maintain operational functionality.  Key practitioner 
issues within this include; what information are we making available to decision makers? Is this the most 
appropriate information for them to make decisions from? Are we capturing not only the final decision but 
also the contributing factors that led to that approach being decided upon? How do we intend on 
incorporating this information into organizational learning to contribute to future collective sensemaking?  
The airport observation highlighted a strong sense of understanding prior experiences and how they impact 
present situations but there is room for improvement in framing learning from events as a means to enhance 
decision making and learning.  Improved training in both desktop and live exercise forms were discussed as 
potential solutions.   
 
Distributive Power-base 
The third component of distributive power-base emphasizes that a traditional hierarchal structure is 
replaced with a flat decision making structure which maintains continual situational awareness of events.  
This is closely related to how high performance combat teams function whereby they have the ability to 
make fast decisions which keep true to the mission objective without continually needing to consult with 
superiors.  In an idea sense this would mean airport operators on the ground have the ability to decide 
quickly what needs to take place to minimize impacts and inform superiors of decisions at an appropriate 
time.  This presents the challenge of how to culturally empower expert decision makers to take command 
and how to utilize business-as-usual managers in a consultative and facilitation, rather than decision making, 
role.  In an airport this would require the fast tasking of specialist teams with appropriate training and 
knowledge to deal with specific events.  As airports function as a mix of both critical infrastructure and 
commercial objectives, these teams would be a non-traditional business unit.  The airport in question 
highlighted this as a particularly difficult concept and that a hierarchal structure is still present in some 
capacity even during a crisis.  Furthermore, they highlighted the difficulty of business-as-usual managers to 
“let go” and let experts function as autonomous decision makers.   
 
Dynamic Task Allocation 
The fourth component of dynamic task allocation discusses how the decision making team is able to be 
empowered to make asset and people management decisions without needing to be tasked by business-as-
usual managers.  A specific example of this functioning in practice was when a wheels up landing took place 
out of business hours and the crisis decision team needed to quickly allocate a range of specific resources to 
minimize impacts to airport operations and move the aircraft off the main runway with minimal disruption.  
Dynamic task allocation was highlighted as a specific strength of the airports current practice through the 
development of explicit governance whereby the emergency management group can make task decisions 
without the need to escalate to senior managers.  A highlighted area for improvement was in business-as-
usual managers volunteering assistance in assets and people rather than seeing it as “not part of my job”.   
 
Shared Understanding of Command Intent 
The fifth component of shared understanding of command intent examines the need for a collective focus 
on the goal of maintaining or recovering operations.  In an airport sense this is important for practitioners to 
understand how the rules of the system change when we move from business-as-usual into a disturbance 
state of operations.  As highlighted by the four previous agility traits, the system is functioning is a different 
manner than normal operations and as such it is vital that the airport understands the authority of crisis 
decision makers and how business-as-usual managers need to adjust to a supportive and facilitative function.  
Key issues highlighted by the airport in question include the need for awareness of how different tactical, 
coordination, and strategic levels fit the overarching need to return to business-as-usual operations.  
Furthermore a key issue for airports is the need to focus on key component tasks and the information flow 
between different levels and groups and how these contribute to the overarching goal.  Current practice 
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highlights that this somewhat disjointed whereby operational and corporate areas could improve their holistic 
understanding.   
 
4. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
As highlighted by this discussion, agile decision making has the potential to enhance reliability of 
operations by involving expert decision makers as both a preemptive and reactive function in the operational 
process, as opposed to their involvement only after a disturbance has been identified.  As a means of 
implementing this approach in an organisation it is important to consider both the explicit and the tacit 
factors of both management and decision making.  The fit between agile decision making and current 
governance structures would require a detailed review to ensure compliance with regulatory and legislative 
standards.  An agile approach can enhance how organizations (and systems of organizations) respond and 
recover from a disturbance event but potentially the most difficult barrier to overcome is the ability to 
empower expert decision makers to perform agile operations when appropriate.  This requires the 
formalisation of agile processes in organisational governance, such as deferral to expertise as an 
organizational norm rather than as an operational exception.  Furthermore, as with the original military 
context which agility was developed in, continual cycles of training, testing, and learning would be required 
to culturally embed agility into a corporate entity to ensure an agile organization does not regress to old 
habits.   
 
The authors note that this study represents a single qualitative approach in aviation agility.  It is proposed 
that this work function as a means of furthering discussion about the potential of this area to be utilized in a 
commercial sense and serve as a foundation for future work in the area.  A particular focus may be building 
on other airport sites to address significance for the aviation context along with investigating other critical 
infrastructure contexts such as water, electricity and transportation.   
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